

(Note, 87, Aug 30 - these are quotes from a Damage Assessment after learning that the loss, by audio monitoring of typewriters in Moscow Embassy, and probably read all traffic for years).

CRISIS STUDY AUDIO INTELL

1) General conclusions on small loss - of having SO know our positions, or know of proposals somewhat earlier - raise question as to value of secrecy.

2) Frequent conclusion that compromise was beneficial raise question as to why we "blow" this "channel," and how we can replace it!

(In contrast to "the private channel," what do we call this one?)

3) If Soves knew the take was comprehensive (except for some ~~classified~~ handwritten items, some conversations) they could make inferences from omissions, or from evident lack of foreknowledge by US or from US failure to inform Ambassador.

Also, take would reveal US foreknowledge (perhaps accompanied by inaction: as in Hungary?), assumptions, focus of interest, inattention.

to US

If revelation of "final offers," etc. was beneficial the lack of such messages could only be reassuring to Soves!

Beneficial if read:

80000 1) Message to Berlin, June 53 that offer to Chicom was last we would make; we would consider additional military measures if rejected.

Thompson 2) Would have revealed our determination to stand firm on Berlin. ^{the} ~~As General~~, "in the majority of cases

3) Thompson: General view is the compromise of our traffic would have been helpful to the Soviets and helpful to us in a tactical sense but would have been, in the majority of cases, helpful in the strategic sense, given the nature of our policies. The Soviets by nature & training highly suspicious and would normally attribute to us the worst possible intentions ~~or intentions~~ and objectives. This traffic, if believed by them, would have revealed that these suspicions were unfounded.

4) First indication of shift in Sov position on Disarm talks 1961 came after McCloy recommended talks be broken off because of Sov intransigence.

Bad?

- 1) Iraq: British message of possibility of increased Arab pressure on Iraq, increasing danger of Iraq involvement if fighting continued, possibly through volunteers.
- 2) Berlin: revealed wavering on part of some Allies
- 3) If assumptions of this ^{limited} situation were correct, they might set plan misinterpretation (Tanner, 1954).
- 4) Knew all Berlin plans, etc.
- 5) U-2

Thompson: What was distribution? Highly prob only very top officials got it, at most only 2 or 3 officials in the FO; possible that Thompson himself not informed. If true, this would reduce tactical advantages to SU.

[But: info differential in SU.

+ What would K infer from lack of guidance to Koller, 16-22 Oct; (or JFK's failure to tell Thompson 18 Oct) or 1 Oct - 16 Oct.]

Koller: have frequently made statements in hope, if not expectation, they would be overheard.

Hungary: Zhdanov told Bodin that no additional Sov
troops had entered Hungary. This belied
neither by Dept nor Ambegation Budapest.

We had evidence large Sov forces entering
Hungary from Rumania + SO by Nov 1; evidence to
US SO planned massive intervention, barring a
last-minute change of heart. Joint Plan 5 on 4 Nov

complete of 8-9 Nov [What did we do to induce change of
heart? Did traffic reassure Sovs —

P.S. by failing to indicate intent to react?